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Abstract
As the core of cryptography, hash function is one of the basic techniques for information security. During the last few
years, considerable effort has been devoted to research on chaos-based hash functions. Nevertheless, the
corresponding analysis of them lag far behind. In this paper, a new efficient scheme for parallel hash function based
on high-dimensional chaotic map is proposed. In the proposed scheme, the confusion as well as the diffusion effect is
enhanced significantly by utilizing two nonlinear coupling parameters. Theoretical and experimental results indicate
that the proposed scheme can satisfy all performance requirements of hash function such as desired statistical
properties and strong collision resistance. At the same time, the proposed scheme can keep the parallel merit and
message sensitivity with high potential to be adopted for network security.
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1 Introduction
As a ubiquitous phenomenon in nature, chaos is a kind
of deterministic random-like process generated by non-
linear dynamical systems. Chaotic dynamical systems
possess the following main characteristics: sensitivity to
tiny changes in initial conditions, random-like behavior,
ergodicity, unstable periodic orbits, desired diffusion and
confusion properties, and one-way property. Due to these
properties, chaotic systems have become a very good can-
didate for use in the field of cryptography. The existing
related research progress includes chaos-based symmet-
ric encryptions [1-7], security protocols [8,9], asymmetric
encryptions [10,11], and hash functions [12-18].
Hash function is one of the major tools in cryptog-
raphy, which is usually used for integrity protection in
conjunction with message authentication and digital sig-
nature schemes. There are many famous hash functions
such as MD4, MD5, and SHA-1 [19-21] which are real-
ized by complicated methods based on logical operations
or multi-round iteration of some available ciphers [22].
Recently, some of the weaknesses of the famous and
widely used hash functions MD5 and SHA-1 have been
*Correspondence: amir.akhavan@yahoo.com
1School of Computer Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 USM, Penang,
Malaysia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
discovered. Apparently, it is very easy to carry out colli-
sion attack on MD5 [23-25], and at the same time, the
collision attack on SHA-1 is close to practical [26]. Thus,
the research on the design of secure and efficient hash
functions attracts more and more attention.
In recent years, there has been a considerable advance
in the construction of one-way hash functions based on
chaotic maps, including 1D piecewise linear/nonlinear
chaoticmap [27,28], 2D nonlinear piecewise linear chaotic
map [29], high-dimensional chaotic map [30], chaotic
neural networks [31], hyper chaos [32], and chaos S-Box
[33], which indicates extensive effort in constructing hash
functions based on different new methods although some
of these new algorithms have been proven to be insecure
[22,34-37].
Recently, high-dimensional dynamical systems have
been an attractive research field for many scientific areas
particularly in computer sciences and have received con-
siderable attention in secure communication field. This
kind of chaotic map has better mixing nature and higher
complexity. Moreover, it is more difficult or even impos-
sible to predict the time series generated by the system.
These properties granted them to be a good candi-
date for secure communications. To the best of our
knowledge, only a few chaos-based hash functions with
high-dimensional dynamical systems have been reported
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[30,32,38]. For instance, an algorithm for image encryp-
tion based on a high-dimensional chaotic map with
high efficiency is proposed in [4]. The high-dimensional
chaotic maps [4] possess remarkable dynamical proper-
ties such as invariant measure, ergodicity, the possibility
of KS-entropy calculation, and bifurcation without any
period doubling [4,39,40].
Hence, in this paper, a new scheme for constructing
parallel hash function based on high-dimensional trigono-
metric map is suggested, and efficiency of the scheme is
investigated in detail. The proposed algorithm fulfills the
performance requirements of hash functions. Theoretical
analysis and experimental results indicate that the pro-
posed scheme demonstrated several interesting features,
such as good statistical properties, strong collision resis-
tance, and high flexibility. At the same time, it can keep
the parallel structure and message sensitivity as required
by practical hash functions.
2 A one-way hash function based on high
dimensional chaotic map
2.1 High dimensional chaotic map
Hierarchy of the high-dimensional chaotic maps with
ergodic behavior in the two intervals [ 0, 1] and [ 0,∞) is
presented in [4,39,40]. One-parameter families of chaotic
maps of the interval [0, 1] with an invariant measure can
be defined as the ratio of polynomials of degree N
N (x,α) = α
2F
1 + (α2 − 1)F ,
where α is the control parameter. F substitutes with the
Chebyshev polynomial of the first kindTN (x), andN is the
degree of Chebyshev polynomials. Hence,
N (x,α) = α
2(TN (
√x))2
1 + (α2 − 1)(TN (√x))2 .
We used its conjugate or isomorphic map [39,41]. Con-
jugacy means that the invertible map h(x) = (1−x)x maps
I =[ 0, 1] into [ 0,∞) [39,42]. Using the hierarchy of fami-
lies of one-parameter chaotic maps, we can generate new
hierarchy of tripled maps with an invariant measure. In
this paper, one of the hierarchies of the chaotic map in the
interval [ 0,∞) is adapted for constructing chaos-based
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where α1, α2(x(n)) and α3(x(n), y(n)) are control
parameters of the chaotic map, and N1, N2, and N3
are degrees of Chebyshev polynomials. In this paper,
Equation 1 as a high-dimensional chaotic map is used in
the process of generating a hash function.
2.2 Proposed algorithm
In this section, the framework of the proposed algorithm
is described.
Step 1. First, the messageM : {0, 1}a is input and
transformed into message blocksMn×1.
Step 2. Keys of the algorithm (initial conditions,
control parameters, and coupling parameters) are
input.
Step 3. Creation and initiation of the threads T1 and
T2. In this step, the two separate threads are
generated, and initial conditions and control
parameters are initiated (the threads are
demonstrated in Figure 1 using two parallel vertical
rectangles).
Step 4. In order to remove the transient effect and
also initiate the initial conditions of the threads,
Equation 1 is iterated 1,500 times, and the initial
conditions for the threads are set (x′0 = x1,000,
y′0 = y1,000, and z′0 = z1,000 for thread one (T1) and
x′′0 = x1,500, y′′0 = y1,500, and z′′0 = z1,500 for thread
two (T2)).
Step 5. Each thread processes one chunk of the
message using yi and zi of the map in Equation 1, and
in each round, the control parameters are modified
using the value of the processed chunk of the
message and new initial conditions yi and zi. This
step is repeated until the message is exhausted and
the final zn in each of the threads is used to generate
matrices D′ and D′′ (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Block diagram.
Step 6. The matrices D′ and D′′ are generated using
the final values of zn in step 5 (see Figure 1). In this
step, the chaotic map, Equation 1, is iterated L/8
times (L is the final size of the hash value which by
default is set to 256). Finally, the matrices are
combined using the function mentioned below.
Function Combine(D′[ 1..k] ,D′′[ 1..k] )
For i = 0 to k
If D′[ i] mod 2 = 0
D[ i]= D′[ i] XOR D′′[ i];
Else






Step 7. The final value of the hash function is output.
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Figure 1 shows a block diagram that illustrates the steps
in the algorithm. In this algorithm, the values of the
parameters are as follows:
Initial conditions: x = 3, y = 8, and z = 93
Control parameters: α1 = 12, α2 = 1.5, and α3 = 3
Coupling parameters:  = 0.2 and ′ = 0.3
N1 = 20, N2 = 4, and N3=4
Note that all of the control parameters are selected in the
chaotic region.
3 Performance analysis
3.1 Hash results of messages
We have chosen a message with the length of 1, 024 char-
acters, and all the characters are chosen equal to zero; in
this way, it is easier to show the sensitivity of the hash
function to the message.
Condition 1: The original message contains 1, 024
null characters.
Condition 2: Change the first character to 1.
Condition 3: Change the 800th character to Z.
Condition 4: Add a space to the end of the message.
Condition 5: Change the hash key from key α1 = 12
to α1 = 12.00000000000001.
Condition 6: Change the hash key from key x = 3 to
x = 3.00000000000001.
The corresponding hash values in hexadecimal format











The graphical display of binary sequences is shown in
Figure 2. The simulation results indicate that the one-way
property of the proposed algorithm is remarkably high,
and any least difference of the message or key will cause
huge changes in the final hash value.
3.2 Statistic analysis of diffusion and confusion
In order to hide message redundancy, Shannon pointed
in his masterpiece [43] that ‘It is possible to solve many
kinds of ciphers by statistical analysis,’ and therefore, he
suggested two methods of diffusion and confusion for the
purpose of frustrating the powerful statistical analysis. For
the hash value in binary format, each bit is only 1 or 0, so
Figure 2 Hash values under different conditions.
the ideal diffusion effect should be that any tiny changes
in initial conditions lead to the 50% changing probabil-
ity of each bit. A message is selected and the hash value
for the message is generated; then, 1 bit of the message is
changed randomly and a new hash value is generated. The
two hash values are compared with each other, and the
changed bits are counted and called Bi. This test is per-
formed N times, and the corresponding distribution of Bi
is shown as Figure 3a,b, where N = 10, 000.
Minimum changed bit number Bmin = min({Bi}N1 );
Maximum changed bit number Bmax = max({Bi}N1 );
Mean changed bit number B¯ =∑Ni=1 Bi/N ;
Mean changed probability P = (B¯/128) × 100%;













i=1(Bi/128 − P)2 × 100%;




Figure 3 Distribution of changed bit number. (a) Plot of Bi and (b) histogram of Bi .
Through the tests with N = 512, 1,024, 2,048, and
10,000, respectively, the corresponding data are listed in
Table 1. Based on the analysis of the data in Table 1,
we can draw the conclusion: the mean changed bit
number B and the mean changed probability P are
both very close to the ideal value of 64 bits and 50%,
while B and P are very little, which indicates that
the capability for diffusion and confusion is very stable
and strong.
3.3 Analysis of collision resistance and birthday attack
resistance
Collision resistance and birthday attacks are similar in
idea. Both are originated from the probability problem
that two random input data are found to hash to the same
value. In the proposed scheme, the state of the chaotic
map is directly related to each message bit. Also, the con-
trol parameters and the initial conditions of the chaotic
map are fully affected by the message bits. These opera-
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Table 1 Static number of changed bit Bi
N = 512 N = 1, 024 N = 2, 048 N = 10, 000 Mean
B¯ 63.8808 63.8339 63.8945 63.9192 63.88212
P (%) 49.9069 49.8703 49.9176 49.9369 49.90793
B 6.0032 5.8662 5.7711 5.6467 5.8218
P(%) 4.6900 4.5830 4.5087 4.4115 4.5483
Bmin 45 45 43 41 43.5
Bmax 80 82 82 84 82
tions will ensure that each bit of the final hash value is
related to all the bits of the message. Therefore, even 1-bit
change in themessage would lead to a completely different
hash code.Moreover, the initial conditions and the control
parameters of the chaotic map are related to the message
and the state of the map, so the keyed hash function is so
much sensitive to the keys.
3.4 Collision test
In order to investigate the collision resistance capability of
the proposed algorithm, we have performed the following
test [12,28,29]: first, a message is randomly chosen, and
the hash value is generated for it and stored in ASCII for-
mat. Then, a bit from a random position in the message
is chosen and its value is changed, and a new hash value
is generated for the new changed message and is stored
in ASCII format. Two hash values are compared, and the
number of ASCII character with the same value at the
same location in the hash value is counted. The absolute
difference of two hash values and the theoretical number
of ω with different values during N independent experi-
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where ei and e′i are the ith entry of the original and the
new hash value, respectively, and function t(.) converts the
entries to their equivalent decimal value. In Equation 4,
ω = 0, 1, ..., s. The theoretical values for Equation 4 are as
follows [14]:WN (0) = 9, 416,WN (1) = 572,WN (2) = 12,
and WN (ω) = 0 for ω = 3, 4, ..., 16. Also, the experi-
mental values of WN (ω), the proposed algorithm, are as
follows: WN (0) = 9, 387, WN (1) = 591, WN (2) = 22,
and WN (ω) = 0 for ω = 3, 4, ..., 16. A plot of the distri-
bution of the number of ASCII characters with the same
value at the same location in the hash value is given in
Figure 4a,b. It seems that the proposed algorithm pos-
sesses a stronger collision resistance capability than the




Figure 4 Distribution ofw. w represents the number of 8-bit
subblocks with the same value at the same location in hash value
(N = 10, 000). (a) Decimal scale ofWN(ω) and (b) logarithmic scale of
WN(ω).
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3.5 Theoretical value of mean of absolute difference
With the assumption thatH is a discrete uniform distribu-
tion in the range of 0 to 255 (with 16 elements), the ideal
mean value of this distribution would be equal to the 12
maximum value of the distribution (in themaximum value
condition, all elements are equal to 255): 255×162 = 2, 040.
Using the ideal theoretical value of the hash digest H, we
can calculate the ideal theoretical absolute difference of
the two hash digests. With the assumption that the two
hash digests H and H ′ are ideally uniform, the ‘Sum of
Absolute Difference’ of these two digests has to be equal
to 23 of the mean value of a uniform distribution [47]. As
the mean value of a uniform distribution with the char-
acteristics of a hash digest with the size of 128 bits is
equal to 2,040, therefore, the ideal mean value of the abso-
lute difference for H and H ′ is equal to 23 × 2, 040 =
1, 360.Minimum,maximum, andmean values of the abso-
lute difference of two hash values are 547, 2, 246, and
1, 365.9641, respectively. It can be seen that the mean of
absolute difference is 1, 365.9641 and is very close to the
ideal value.
3.6 Pseudo-collision resistance
Without loss of generality, normally in a collision attack,
the attacker not only has access to the message (M) and
can modify each block (Mi) of the message during the
hashing process, but also can change the medial hash
value (Hi−1). This type of collision attack is usually called
pseudo-collision attack. The main goal of this attack is
to use the weaknesses in the compression function so
that the attacker can find a way to reconstruct a hash
value for a different message [45,46]. In the proposed
algorithm, the message is processed twice (two different
threads), once from the beginning to the end and once
from the end to the beginning of the message, so that
there would be two medial hash values at the same time
for each message block, which with regard to a small
change in one or both of the medial values (in here, the
control parameters and initial conditions) would lead to
a completely different sequence (because of the nature
of the proposed high-dimensional chaotic map), so it is
almost impossible to find a pattern by changing these
values.
3.7 Resistance of forgery attacks
Most of the parallel hash function algorithms have a
mixing section in their structure which usually uses the
XOR operation for this propose. This operation lets the
attackers use the privilege of communicative law and
practice forgery attack on the hash function. Some of
these algorithms are broken by forgery attack [37]. Not
only does the proposed algorithm process the whole
message from two sides (which leads to high complex-
ity in mixture), but also in the final step, instead of
a simple XOR operation, a conditional method is used
in order to resist forgery attack in any section of the
algorithm.
3.8 Key space analysis
In this algorithm, besides the control parameter and ini-
tial condition of the piecewise nonlinear chaotic map, the
parameters of the one-dimensional chaotic map are cho-
sen as the secret keys. From the security point of view,
the key space for a cryptographic algorithm should not be
less than 2128 in order to resist brute force attacks [48,49].
If the precision 10−14 is used, the key space size for two
coupling parameters, three initial conditions, and three
control parameters of the chaotic map is over 2279, so the
key space is very large to resist all kinds of brute force
attacks.
3.9 Analysis of speed
The proposed hash function is a multi-threaded algo-
rithm which works fine on both single and multi-core
processors, while the speed of the algorithm eventually
doubles on a multi-core processor. Moreover, the process
time needed for generating the hash value is in direct
relation with the message length; in Figure 5, we can
see that the computational complexity of the algorithm
is linear and almost equal to 	(n). Although the speed
of the algorithms is lower than the existing traditional
hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5 [20], it is, how-
ever, acceptable for practical use; at the same time, the
algorithm is so flexible since the digest size can be 128,
160, 256, or 512 bits in length. Finally, we present the
average encryption speed comparison based on the spec-
ified platform with some hash algorithms [12,13,20,21,
28,29,50,51]. The average encryption speed of our algo-
rithm (45 Mbps) is higher than that in [12,13,50,51].
In addition, the algorithms of [20,21,28,29] show higher
encryption speed.
3.10 Uniform distribution on hash space
To check the distribution property in hash space, similar
to that in [14], the following test is performed: two hash
values are generated according to the method described
in the previous subsection, and then, the number of the
bits changed at each bit’s location is counted. Figure 6
shows the statistical results for N = 10, 000. The mini-
mum, maximum, andmean of the changed bit number are
4, 896, 5, 124, and 5, 063, respectively, for N = 10, 000.
It can be seen that the mean of the toggled bit num-
bers is 5, 063 and is very close to the ideal value of 5, 000
(half of the test times). All toggled bit numbers of each
bit location in hash space also concentrate around the
ideal value. Apparently, this shows the resistance against
statistical attack.
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Figure 5 Computational time vs. message size.
3.11 Randomness tests for the hash
Cryptographic hash functions are an important tool of
cryptography and play a fundamental role in efficient and
secure information processing. Cryptographic hash func-
tions can be used to construct pseudo-random number
generators. To ensure the security of a cryptosystem, the
cipher must have some properties such as good distribu-
tion, long period, high complexity, and efficiency. In this
algorithm, several tests of randomness are performed on a
stream of random numbers generated by themain dynam-
ical system (Equation 1) of the hash function in order to
test the randomness of the presented algorithm. These
Figure 6 Distribution of hash value in hash space. The minimum, maximum, and mean of the toggled bit number are 4,896, 5,124, and 50,063,
respectively, for N = 10, 000.
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tests include DIEHARD [52], NIST statistical test suite
[53], and ENT test suite [54]. According to Tables 2 and
3, 4, and 5 which present NIST, DIEHARD, and ENT test
results, respectively, of the sample, it can be concluded
that the stream has a highly random behavior.
3.12 Resistance to birthday attack
The birthday attack is one of the common classic attacks
on cryptographic hash functions, which is independent of
the algorithm, and can be applied on any algorithm. The
main goal of this attack is to find two messages with iden-
tical hash values with less than 2n/2 trials (n is the size of
hash value) [46,51,55]. In fact, the algorithm is flexible so
that the length of the hash value can be tuned. If the hash
value size is set to 128, the difficulty of the attack is 264
which is huge enough to resist brute force attack. Also in
the proposed algorithm, in order to analyze the security
and resistance against such an attack, several tests includ-
ing the random number batteries and collision tests are
applied. It can be seen from the results in Table 5 that
the entropy of the random numbers generated by the hash
function is very close to the ideal value (7.999994 ≈ 8)
and that the serial correlation coefficient in the same table
is very close to zero, which demonstrates the collision
resistance nature of the algorithm. The proposed algo-
rithm, which is visually discussed using the block diagram
(Figure 1), is very complex, and the initial conditions and
control parameters are modified in each round. According
to [56], ‘if an appropriate padding scheme is used and the
compression function is collision-resistant, then the hash
function will also be collision resistant’. Therefore, the
results of the tests, size of the hash value for the presented
algorithm, and collision resistance of the proposed algo-
rithm suggest that the effectiveness of the birthday attack
is almost impossible and that the algorithm is resistant
against this type of attack.
3.13 Flexibility
In this paper, an algorithm based on high-dimensional
chaotic map is proposed in order to solve the problems
such as the size of hash functions, padding of the mes-
sage, resistance against differential attacks, and capability
of efficiently working on multi-core CPUs using paral-
lel processing. Although the algorithm is designed as an
Table 2 Results of the SP800-22 test suite for the 32-bit proposed high-dimensional map
Test name Test parameters P value Result
Frequency 0.671779 Success
Block-frequency (m = 128) 0.911413 Success
Runs (M = 10, 000) 0.739918 Success
Long runs of ones 0. 66882 Success
Rank 0.253551 Success
Spectral DFT 0.5622515 Success
No overlapping templates (m = 9, B = 101001100) 0.739918 Success
Overlapping templates (m = 9,M = 1, 032, N = 968) 0.911413 Success
Universal (L = 7, Q = 1, 280, K = 141, 577) 0.602458 Success
Lempel-Ziv complexity 0.662344 Success
Linear complexity 0.407091 Success
Serial P value 1 0.602458 Success
Serial P value 2 0.02624 Success
Approximate entropy (m = 10) 0.299251 Success
Cumulative sum forward 0.534146 Success
Cumulative sum reverse 0.035174 Success
Random excursions X = −4 0.637119 Success
Random excursions X = −3 0.834308 Success
Random excursions X = −2 0.991468 Success
Random excursions X = −1 0.066882 Success
Random excursions X = 1 0.275709 Success
Random excursions X = 2 0.213309 Success
Random excursions X = 3 0.122325 Success
Random excursions X = 4 0.437274 Success
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Table 3 Results of the SP800-22 test suite for the 32-bit
proposed high-dimensional map
Random excursion variant Test parameters P value Result
(state x)
Random excursions X = −9 0.964295 Success
Random excursions X = −8 0.213309 Success
Random excursions X = −7 0.911413 Success
Random excursions X = −6 0.350485 Success
Random excursions X = −5 0.637119 Success
Random excursions X = −4 0.834308 Success
Random excursions X = −3 0.964295 Success
Random excursions X = −2 0.637119 Success
Random excursions X = −1 0.999438 Success
Random excursions X = 1 0.834308 Success
Random excursions X = 2 0.534146 Success
Random excursions X = 3 0.834308 Success
Random excursions X = 4 0.739918 Success
Random excursions X = 5 0.834308 Success
Random excursions X = 6 0.964295 Success
Random excursions X = 7 0.275709 Success
Random excursions X = 8 0.122325 Success
Random excursions X = 9 0.066882 Success
Table 4 DIEHARD test suite for the 32-bit proposed
high-dimensional map
Test name Average value Result
Birthday spacing 0.800832 Success
Overlapping permutation 0.693145 Success
Binary rank 31×31 0.974342 Success
Binary rank 32×32 0 .770208 Success
Binary rank 6×8 0.264802 Success




Count the ones 01 0.104101 Success
Count the ones 02 0.651653 Success
Parking lot 0.926198 Success
Minimum distance 0 .748646 Success
3DS spheres 0 .137205 Success
Squeeze 0 .019340 Success
Overlapping sum 0 .964091 Success
Runs 0.645063 Success
Craps 0.480936 Success
Table 5 Max grade of ENT test suite
Test name Average value Result
Entropy 7.999994 Success
Arithmetic mean 127.5165 Success
Monte Carlo 3.140157946 Success
Chi square 55.73 Success
Serial correlation coefficient 0.000277 Success
unkeyed hash function, the control parameters and the
initial conditions of the algorithm can be treated as the
secrete key for a keyed hash function. In comparison to
the conventional hash algorithm such as MD5, MAC-
DES, and HMAC-MD5 with fixed length, the proposed
algorithm is advantageous in terms of adaptation to 160,
256, or 512 bits, with a small change in the steps, and
since the algorithm is designed in such a way that it can
work in parallel, therefore in longer digest speed, it would
not be affected so much. Furthermore, in the proposed
algorithm, the chaotic map is iterated with a double-
precision floating-point arithmetic. A double-precision
floating-point number is represented according to the
IEEE 754 floating-point standard found in virtually almost
all computers produced since 1980 [57]. The program
is implemented in Visual C++.NET, and the standard of
the floating point which is used in this compiler is the
IEEE 754 floating-point standard so that the hash values
generated on any computer would be the same.
4 Conclusion
A novel parallel hash function based on a high-
dimensional chaotic map is proposed. In the core of
the presented dynamical system lies interesting features
such as invariant measure, ergodicity, bifurcation without
period doubling, and the possibility of KS-entropy cal-
culation [4]. By using significant properties of chaos and
structure of the chaotic map, in the proposed algorithm,
the message is totally connected to all parameters, so this
structure can ensure the uniform sensitivity of hash value
to the message. Since the coupled architecture is a com-
plex chaotic system, it is very difficult or even impossible
to predict its time series. Therefore, the complexity and
nonlinearity of the chaotic map yield strong bit confusion
and diffusion with the low expense of floating-point com-
putations. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulation
indicate that the proposed new scheme achieves several
desirable features such as high flexibility, good statistical
properties, parallel implementation, high key sensitivity,
and message sensitivity. Moreover, it resists linear anal-
ysis, exhaustive key search, and statistical attack. It can
be concluded that the proposed algorithm fulfills the per-
formance requirements of hash function and that it is
practical and reliable, with high potential to be adopted in
real-world applications.
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